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“Zealous conviction is a dangerous substitute for an open mind.”  
― Dr. Elizabeth Loftus 
 




Preface: A Fear of Flying Tomatoes 
 I first heard about false memories when I was a senior in high school. It feels very 
counterintuitive and ironic to be saying this when the memory I am about to recollect could, in of 
itself, be a false memory. I was in my AP Psychology class one morning discussing the 
implications of memory research when I first heard the name Elizabeth Loftus. For those who 
may not know, Elizabeth Loftus is a Cognitive Psychologist who pioneered the research in false 
memories and continues to study why our memory systems seem so reliable, but in all actuality 
are extremely fallible. She is easily one of the most decorated and controversial figures in the 
psychological community and in the history of the field.  
 In a now famous study conducted by Loftus and her former colleague at The University 
of Washington, participants were shown a video clip of a car crash. After watching the video, 
participants were asked questions pertaining to the accident they had just witnessed. For 
instance, some participants were asked “about how fast were the cars going when they hit into 
each other” while other participants were asked “about how fast were the cars going when they 
smashed into each other” (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). When participants were questioned a week 
later about the accident, those who were asked whether the cars smashed into each other believed 
that the cars were going faster than they actually were when they crashed. Likewise, those 
participants were also more likely to believe that there was broken glass at the scene when there 
actually was none.  
 This finding is better known as the misinformation effect, which asserts that people who 
are given misinformation, or incorrect or suggestible information, after-the-fact can be led to 
believe that the event was different than it actually was. This study was the first of its kind to 
seriously investigate the credibility of eyewitness testimony and whether memories can be 




altered by the information being supplied to witnesses after the event. Furthermore, this study 
effectively showed that the way questions about events are worded, either through suggestibility 
or through leading wording, can significantly alter people’s memories of the event itself.  
 Since the inception of this study, Loftus has continued to do research in the area of false 
memories. The implications of her research have been insurmountable, ranging from food 
preferences and “repressed” memories in therapy to the reliability of eyewitness testimony 
(Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Bernstein, Pernat, & Loftus, 2011; Clifasefi, Bernstein, Mantonakis, 
& Loftus, 2013; Loftus & Ketcham, 1996). In fact, she has been active in the judicial system in 
testifying against the use of eyewitness testimony. To date, Loftus has testified in over 250 cases, 
some as infamous as the trials of serial killer Ted Bundy, O.J. Simpson, the Oklahoma City 
bombing, and even the litigation of Michael Jackson (Zagorski, 2005).  
 False memories are critical in the scope of the courtroom. Through methods like the 
misinformation effect, juries and eyewitnesses can be easily manipulated by lawyers and police 
officers, either intentionally or unintentionally, to alter their testimony. This quickly becomes an 
ethical dilemma when it comes to the integrity of our court system. The 7th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution effectively established a judicial system that introduced a “trial by 
jury” format in civil cases, meaning that a panel of peers ultimately decides your fate under the 
eyes of the law. This premise, though great in theory, is a prime example of how even our 
Founding Fathers were misguided by the assumption that memory is incorruptible and infallible. 
Many people, even in our contemporary world, falsely believe that memory operates like a 
videotape, recording in a perfectly linear fashion our every move and can be played back to you 
later in that exact same way. Rather, as people like Loftus have pointed out, memory is a highly 
constructive process that is susceptible to being altered at any stage of the memory process: from 




the emotions present at the moment the memory is formed to who you are with while the 
memory is being stored, and, as the misinformation effect suggests, the framing of the words that 
are being presented to you when the memory is being retrieved.  
 Statistics show us that in the United States alone, around 200 people a day become 
criminal defendants based on eyewitness testimony (Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, & Montgomery, 
2004). According to the Innocence Project, a nonprofit organization seeking to end the wrongful 
conviction and imprisonment of innocent people, as of 2012, DNA evidence has exonerated 341 
people who were wrongly convicted and who served an average of 13 years in prison for crimes 
they did not commit. As much as 75% of these convictions involved eyewitness testimony 
(Goldstein, 2014). It is no coincidence that the shockingly high number of wrongful convictions 
are in some way tied to our over-reliance, and therefore over-confidence, in eyewitness 
testimony. Our blind trust and faith in our own memories, and the memories of others, are often a 
fatal flaw of human psychology, deeply rooted in the misconception that memory operates like a 
videotape. As cognitive psychologist Dr. Bruce Goldstein stated, “many of these miscarriages of 
justice and others, some of which will undoubtedly never be discovered, are based on the 
assumption, made by jurors and judges, that people see and report things accurately” (2014). In 
other words, while we think our memory is reliable, more often than not, it is entirely unreliable. 
 Some areas where the integrity of our judicial system has been especially challenged is 
with sexual assault allegations and with so-called “repressed memories.” As with any memory 
from your adult life, false memories from early childhood experiences can also be created by 
suggestion. This issue of repressed memories of childhood trauma and sexual abuse came to its 
peak during the 1990s, when numerous cases regarding this subject matter came forward that 




challenged the psychological community and even the broader popular culture about our long-
held beliefs about how memory truly functions.  
 I first became aware of this controversy when I watched the Netflix documentary series 
called “The Keepers,” which I would highly recommend you watch after reading this thesis. This 
seven-part docuseries centers around the cold case of Sister Catherine Cesnik, a nun and school 
teacher at Archbishop Keough High School in Baltimore, Maryland, who was brutally murdered 
in 1969 (Riddick, 2017). It is heavily implied, if not explicitly suggested, throughout the series 
that the Head Master of the school, Father Joseph Maskell, may have had something to do with 
Cesnik’s eerie disappearance. In the third episode of the series, entitled “The Revelation,” it is 
exposed that a couple of women who had formerly attended Archbishop Keough High School 
around the time of Cesnik’s murder were alleged victims of sexual abuse by none other than 
Father Joseph Maskell, who was also under suspicion for the murder of Catherine Cesnik. In 
1996, decades after these women had attended Archbishop Keough, several of these “Jane Does” 
came forward and provided evidence to suggest that they were victims of sexual abuse by Father 
Maskell. This case, properly titled Jane Doe et al. v. A. Joseph Maskell et al., started an ongoing 
conversation about false memories and sexual trauma in the psychological community that 
continues to this day (JANE DOE, ET AL. v. A. JOSEPH MASKELL, ET AL., n.d.).  
 In the litigation of the case, the main concern that the prosecution presented was why 
these women, who had apparently experienced such intense and traumatic abuse, had not come 
forward sooner. Was it that they had repressed the abuse from their memory, perhaps? In the 
state of Maryland, as well as many other states throughout the United States, there is a strict 
statute of limitations barring victims from coming forward and claiming sexual abuse after a 
certain amount of time has passed. In theory, this statute was implemented to try and prevent 




false allegations from coming forward. In other words, the prosecution was trying to implicitly 
argue that these victims were either faking their claims or were subject to the forgetting clause of 
the statute of limitations; both of which would be due cause for the dismissal of their claims. The 
defense, in turn, argued that due to the severity of the incidences, most of these victims actually 
“repressed” the trauma, and with news of the Cesnik case again coming to the forefront, 
something caused these memories to resurface rather than simply be forgotten.  
 Repression is a psychoanalytical term originally popularized by Freud that is technically 
classified as a defense mechanism (Freud, 1957). People who supposedly repress memories are 
attempting to redirect unacceptable or unpleasant thoughts from the conscious mind to the 
unconscious; thereby, avoiding the potential stress or anxiety associated with that particular 
thought. The defense was trying to establish that these women did not just simply or passively 
forget their abuse; however, they had actively repressed these memories, which were later able to 
be triggered and retrieved. In their minds, there was a critical distinction to be made between the 
psychological concepts of forgetting and repression. However, the results of the case suggested 
differently:  
“After reviewing the arguments on both sides of the issue, [the court is] unconvinced that 
repression exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal process of 
forgetting. Because we find these two processes to be indistinguishable scientifically, it 
follows that they should be treated the same legally. Therefore, we hold that the mental 
process of repression of memories of past sexual abuse does not activate the discovery 
rule. The plaintiffs' suits are thus barred by the statute of limitations" (“COURT 
DECISION ON RECOVERED MEMORY THEORY,” n.d.). 




In other words, this trial, though on the outside appeared to be merely a case involving sexual 
assault allegations and a blatant misconduct of power, was deeply rooted in psychological 
theory. The court essentially ruled that there was no difference in the cognitive processes of 
repression or forgetting; therefore, the defense’s claim that these women’s testimony should not 
subject to the statute of limitations was not granted. This ruling dramatically shifted the way 
cognitive psychologists, and the general public, thought about memory and memory errors.  
 After this trial, the American Psychological Association (APA) issued many statements 
in an attempt to clarify some of the cognitive and legal discrepancies between forgetting, 
repression, memory, and false memories. According to the APA,  
“It's important to state that there is a consensus among memory researchers and clinicians 
that most people who were sexually abused as children remember all or part of what 
happened to them although they may not fully understand or disclose it. Concerning the 
issue of a recovered versus a [false memory], like many questions in science, the final 
answer is yet to be known. But most leaders in the field agree that although it is a rare 
occurrence, a memory of early childhood abuse that has been forgotten can be 
remembered later. However, these leaders also agree that it is possible to construct 
convincing [false memories] for events that never occurred. The mechanism(s) by which 
both of these phenomena happen are not well understood and, at this point it is 
impossible, without other corroborative evidence, to distinguish a true memory from a 
false one” (“Questions and Answers about Memories of Childhood Abuse,” n.d.). 
This statement from the national organizing body of psychology is a critical clarification of how 
false memories may operate, especially in context of sexual abuse cases. While it should be 
noted that the vast majority of the claims of early sexual abuse are not fake, many do not come 




forward initially because they may not have the vocabulary to describe what has happened to 
them or may be uncomfortable or even scared to disclose the abuse. This is especially true if the 
victim was a child at the time of the incident. The real issue here isn’t whether or not the abuse 
has happened. Rather, if the details of the incident are indeed reliable, they, like most other 
memories, were subject to the normal forgetting process; thereby, making them vulnerable to 
becoming false memories. As of yet, there is still no clear-cut answer to this question that has 
continued to plague the psychological community.  
 Outside the psychological community, Loftus has received harsh criticism for the way 
she has testified against eyewitness testimony and acquitted many people for lack of credible 
evidence who otherwise would have been incarcerated. In fact, she has received hate mail, death 
threats, been accused of satanic rituals, conspiring against the government, and has even had to 
have protection by security guards while giving invited talks and presentations (TED). At one 
conference, Loftus herself even said something along the lines of not wanting to “wear my best 
jacket because of a fear of flying tomatoes” (“Elizabeth Loftus,” 2019). As you can probably tell 
from this circumstantial case, Loftus, as well as several leading researchers of memories and 
false memories, have been extensively criticized for their research within the psychological 
community, the court system, and beyond. For one, the morality of many of Loftus’ early studies 
in particular, like the car crash experiment mentioned earlier, have been deeply scrutinized by 
many psychologists who thought that manipulating people’s memories was unethical. 
 Regardless of the criticism Loftus has received, she is truly one of the most influential 
figures in my life. She can be accredited to the deep fascination with memory, especially in 
everyday failures of memory, that has continued to haunt me since high school. The idea that 
core memories that you hold so near and close to your heart, such as the day you graduated 




college, your wedding day, or the birth of your child, can actually be filled with discrepancies 
and inaccuracies is both terrifying and absolutely captivating to me.  I also find the area of false 
memories so captivating for the significant implications they have in our court system. As an 
advocate for victims, especially with regards to sexual assault, I often struggle with negotiating 
my deeply held conviction and desire to support and believe others with my knowledge of the 
research in false memories. When I started planning what I wanted to do for my thesis when I 
first came to the Regis University’s Honors Program, I knew from the first day of college that I 
wanted to incorporate false memories somehow into the picture. I just had no idea how I was 
going to do that. It wasn’t until I took a class in the Psychology of Gender that I realized how I 
could shed a new light on one of my favorite areas of research.  
 Along with my love of false memories, I quickly realized my passion for gender research 
in the Psychology of Gender class. In this class, we learned about how gender stereotypes often 
affect our judgment of others and how this can eventually lead to problems at a systemic level. 
For instance, one of the most common gender stereotypes (and myths) is that “women are bad at 
math.” Various theories in the field of psychology suggest that this idea, though completely 
implicit in nature, may be one of the root causes for why there are so few women represented in 
the fields of science, technology, math, and engineering (STEM). It is not a lack of ability; 
rather, it is a matter of stereotyping that may account for the disparity.  
 This got me thinking. If false memories can account for concepts as wide reaching as 
faulty eyewitness testimony and debatable abuse allegations, could this also mean that people 
could hypothetically be led to believe other things? For instance, could women be led to believe 
that they had a negative experience in a STEM subject, which in turn would make them less 
likely to enter a career in that field? My thesis strives to tackle questions such as these in a way 




that brings my two passions of false memories and gender into conversation. I hope that by 
reading this thesis, you get a glimpse into two areas of psychology that are rich in research and 
have crucial implications in so many different areas of life. Hopefully, you will enjoy reading it 
as much as I loved researching, collecting data, and writing about it. If nothing else, perhaps you 
will have a false memory about enjoying it.  





False memories and gender stereotypes were used to investigate if inducing a false 
memory of having a negative experience in a STEM field would affect participant’s 
preferences pertaining to the field. Women were recruited or volunteered to participate in 
the study. In the first session, participants completed a series of questionnaires to gauge 
their pre-existing experiences and attitudes towards STEM and non-STEM related 
subjects (n = 268). In the second session, participants whose responses from the first 
survey qualified, were randomly assigned to either the control (n = 74) or experimental 
condition (n = 71). Participants received a history profile that they were told was 
personalized to them, but it was actually a generic list of items. In the experimental 
condition, one of the critical items on the profile told the participant that they “had a 
negative experience in a math class”. Participants then were asked to elaborate on and 
justify this false experience. Participants in the experimental condition ended the 
experiment with a task used to evaluate if the false memory was successful. They then 
completed all of the measures used in the first session again to compare how their 
experiences and attitudes towards STEM items may have changed since exposure to a 
false memory. Results indicated that the false memory was successfully implanted, as 
indicated by a memory and belief that the false event (i.e., having a negative experience 









False Memories, Stereotype Threat, and Gender Stereotypes 
A vast amount of research exists pertaining to gender representation in certain academic 
subjects and career paths. For example, women have an especially high attrition rate in various 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. This is especially true for 
college-aged students, where we see a two-fold increase in dropout rates for women math 
majors, for example, when compared to men who are majoring in math (Oswald & Harvey, 
2000). Along those lines, women tend to harbor more negative feelings about mathematics and 
other related fields than men (Ashcraft, 2002). Likewise, regardless of gender, mathematics and 
other STEM-related subjects continue to be regarded as a more stereotypically “masculine” 
domain (Leader, 1986).  
People who aspire to be involved in fields that do not adhere to their expected 
occupational roles face many barriers. These barriers are especially damaging to those in 
historically marginalized groups, like women for instance (Luzzo & McWhirter, 2001). People in 
gender-incongruent fields (e.g., a woman who is a surgeon) are often perceived as being less 
competent than people who are employed in a field considered to be consistent with their gender. 
Women who are successful in stereotypically masculine domains often face the predicament of 
being seen as unlikable or being viewed as incompetent; more often than not, they are seen as 
both (Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010). 
While there are many variables that account for why women are so underrepresented in 
the STEM fields, one possible explanation could be related to stereotype threat. Stereotype threat 
is the idea that if you are presented with a stereotype relevant to yourself, your concern about 
confirming that stereotype will actually make the behavior more likely to happen (Deemer, 
Thoman, Chase, & Smith, 2014). Even if you do not explicitly believe or uphold the stereotype, 




implicit biases can still confirm the stereotype under conditions of stereotype threat. For 
instance, when a gender stereotype is presented, it can activate stereotype threat in a way that 
alters behavior to act more in accordance with the stereotype. Numerous studies have shown that 
inducing stereotype threat in women can have very diverse consequences such as scoring lower 
on math tests (Schmader, 2002), undermining their leadership aspirations (Davies, Steele, & 
Spencer, 2005) and lessening their interest in pursuing stereotypically masculine occupations 
(Rudman & Phelan, 2010).  
False memories are memories of events that never actually occurred, but the participant 
was led to believe that they did (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). This can be done through a variety of 
different paradigms, such as through suggestibility and misinformation. This finding 
demonstrates that false memories, though completely fabricated in nature, can still have a 
significant impact on a person’s future behavior. To illustrate this, in one study, people who were 
led to believe they had been sick after drinking certain types of alcohol were found to have less 
preference for that type of alcohol after the false memory was implanted (Clifasefi et al., 2013). 
In general, people are more likely to have both true memories and false memories that are 
consistent with their own predisposed stereotypes (O’Connell & Greene, 2017). In other words, 
people are likely to unknowingly alter and assimilate their memories to be in accordance with 
their preexisting beliefs, regardless of whether those beliefs are accurate. 
One study found that when participants saw a list of either stereotypically female or 
stereotypically male roles, like “quiet” for a female, it led to an increase in the false recognition 
of words not present on the list that were still consistent with that stereotype (Lenton, Blair, & 
Hastie, 2001). For example, participants with strong implicit stereotypes were more likely to 
falsely remember words such as “secretary” and “nurse” that seemingly fit in the feminine 




stereotype. False recognition of gender stereotypic words was especially evident when the 
gender of the participant matched the gender role of the stereotyped words, suggesting that 
people can hold gender stereotypes about their own gender. In sum, even though the gender of 
the participant may increase the recall of gendered stereotyped words, it can also lead to false 
memories. In other words, even indirect associations can drastically influence the reliability of 
your own memory, which can in turn influence your attitudes towards gender stereotypes in 
various occupational settings (Tsukimoto, Hasimoto, Karasawa, & 2011). 
Overview of the Present Study 
Although there is an abundance of research on false memories and stereotypes, there is 
little research on the relationship between false memories and stereotype threat. In other words, 
there is little research examining the idea that false memories can be a potential source for why 
one’s behavior can often conform to stereotypes relevant to themselves (e.g., how having a false 
memory pertinent to STEM may lead to more women opting out of STEM fields).  
The purpose of this study is to investigate if inducing stereotype threat through a false 
memory paradigm can reinforce gender stereotypes and lead to a change in preference for those 
in certain college courses and career paths. In other words, this study will assess if creating a 
false memory about experiences within science fields can have an effect on females’ behaviors 
and preferences pertaining to this field.  
Through this study, I initially gauged the participant’s previous experiences and opinions 
relevant to STEM-related subjects. Then, I attempted to implant a false memory in some of my 
participants that they had a negative experience in a math class when they were younger when 
they actually had not reported having a negative experience.  I hypothesized that the false 




memory would be successfully implanted and that this would result in a decreased preference 
towards STEM-related subjects.   
Method 
Participants 
Prior to experimentation, participants were randomly assigned to the experimental or control 
condition. This was done via a random number generator. Participants who scored less than 4 on 
the first critical question (negative experience in a math class) and greater than 6 on the other 
critical question (positive experience in a math class) on the Life Events Inventory were 
excluded from the experimental condition. This was to avoid including people who already 
report having a memory of a negative experience in a math class from being placed in the 
experimental condition where they were asked to form a false memory about that same exact 
scenario.  
A total of 268 participants took the first survey. All participants were women over the age of 
18. Those that participated were either from Regis University or were invited to participate by 
the primary researcher. They were either recruited from the General Psychology and 
Neuroscience Subject Pool and received course credit for participation or were volunteers who 
received financial compensation in the form of $5.00 per survey.  
Each participant that qualified to take the second survey was randomly assigned via 
random number generator to either the experimental or control condition. A total of 145 out of 
the initial 268 (54.1%) participants qualified for the second survey. A total of 71 participants 
were assigned to the experimental condition and the remaining 74 were assigned to the control 
condition. Of the 145 total participants that qualified for the second survey, only 122 (84.1%) 




actually completed the full survey, including the critical questions, so the remaining 23 
participants’ data were excluded from final analyses.  
Materials  
Science Motivation Questionnaire. The Science Motivation Questionnaire (Appendix 
A) measures self-efficacy within the field of science by asking questions like “I am confident I 
will do well on the science tests” on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “Never” and 5 being 
“Always” (Glynn, Taasoobshirazi, & Brickman, 2009). 
Intended Research Involvement. The Intended Research Involvement scale (Appendix 
B) measures intrinsic research interest by asking questions about the likelihood of the participant 
pursuing research opportunities, with 1 being “Not likely at all” and 5 being “Very likely.” I also 
added a free response question where participants are asked to state their intended major. This 
measure was also adapted from Glynn, Taasoobshirazi, and Brickman (2009). 
Science Career Intent. The Science Career Intent (Appendix C) question is a 
dichotomous question used to assess participant’s intentions to pursue a career in a science field. 
This measure was also adapted from Glynn, Taasoobshirazi, and Brickman (2009). 
Life Events Inventory. Participants also took a 20-item Life Events Inventory 
(Appendix D), which asked the participant to respond to a range of questions pertaining to 
scholastic events that happened before the age of 18 with 1 being “Definitely did not happen” 
and 8 being “Definitely did happen.” This was derived and developed from the research of 
Clifasefi et al. (2013). 
Preferences Inventory. Finally, the Preferences Inventory (Appendix E) gauges their 
preferences regarding different types of subjects, including math. The Preference Inventory was 
also derived and developed from the research done by Clifasefi et al. (2013). 




 Individualized History Profile and Experimental Manipulation. For the second 
session, participants were given an Individualized History Profile (Appendix F). The profile will 
have 4 statements total regarding the participant’s responses from session 1. The critical question 
for those in the experimental condition was #3, which reads “You had a bad experience in a math 
class.” In the control group, #3 was a generic item that read, “You felt proud of your academic 
accomplishments.” This is adapted from Clifasefi et al. (2013). 
Elaboration Exercise and Memory or Belief Task. Participants in both conditions were 
given an Elaboration Exercise (Appendix G) where they were asked to elaborate on the third 
item on their profile. For those in the experimental condition, this was regarding the negative 
experience they had in a math class, while those in the control group were asked to elaborate on 
feeling proud of their academic accomplishments. An Additional Question (Appendix H) was 
asked to all participants about another negative incident that was not on the profile. This was 
used primarily as a manipulation check. Finally, a Memory or Belief Task (Appendix I) was 
given to indicate if the participants had a memory of different events, believed the event of 
having a negative experience in a math class actually occurred, or believed the event never 
occurred. This is adapted from Clifasefi et al. (2013). 
Procedure 
As part of the cover story for the experiment, participants were told that they were 
participating in a study to assess their preferences of different types of classes. Participants took 
both surveys 1 and 2 via an online survey administered through Survey Monkey. In the online 
session 1 questionnaire packet, participants first took the Science Motivation Questionnaire, to 
which they responded to each statement on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being 
“Never” and 5 being “Always.” They then took the Intended Research Involvement Scale and 




respond to each statement on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being “Not likely at all” and 5 
being “Very likely.” Next, they took the Science Career Intent Questionnaire. After this, 
participants were asked to take the Life Events Inventory and rank statements on a scale of 1 to 
8, with 1 being “Definitely did not happen” and 8 being “Definitely did happen.” To conclude 
the first session, participants filled out the Preferences Inventory. This session took an average of 
8 minutes to complete.  
For the second session, participants were emailed the second survey a week after 
completing the first survey. The participant was first shown an Individualized History Profile. 
Through this, participants were told that the profile was created using a sophisticated computer 
program, but all profiles were actually identical to those in their same condition, being either the 
control or experimental condition. This methodology directly replicates that of Clifasefi, et al.  
(2013). Participants then elaborated on this profile via the Elaboration Exercise. These two 
measures attempted to implant a false memory regarding a negative experience in a math class. 
Next, the Additional Question was presented in an effort to conceal the hypothesis from the 
participant. Participants then answered the same questions from session 1. Then, the Memory or 
Belief Task was taken, and participants were asked what they thought the purpose of the study 
was. These sessions took an average of 13.5 minutes to complete, with an average of 12 minutes 
for the experimental group and an average of 15 minutes for the control group. As previously 
stated, this method is a replication of Clifasefi, et al. (2013). 
Results 
Analyses focused on the change in preferences for STEM-related items, as well as the 
memory or belief pertaining to having a negative experience in a math class. This allowed for the 
examination of how the participant’s preferences pertaining to STEM fields may have been 




swayed after the false memory, as well as how successful the implantation of the false memory 
actually was; in other words, how strongly the participant remembered and believed that they 
had a negative experience in a math class, although this was fabricated.   
After participants participated in the first survey, those who were eligible to participant in 
the second session were randomly assigned to either the experimental condition, which received 
the false memory, or the control condition, which did not receive a false memory. Therefore, 
each participant did 2 total rating scores of their preferences throughout the duration of the 
experiment. Since the main area interest was examining how the participant’s preferences 
towards STEM were changed after a false memory, their preference scores across the 2-survey 
session were compared to quantify this phenomenon.  
Question 1: Is it possible to plant a false memory about a negative experience in a math 
class? 
 Scores were examined with a 2 x 2 (Condition [experimental condition, control 
condition] x Time [session 1, session 2]) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). This 
ANOVA revealed that there was an interaction between the condition and time with regards to 
having a negative experience in a math class, F(1, 116) =66.58 p < .001. Those in the 
experimental condition were more strongly convinced that they had actually had a negative 
experience in a math class after receiving the false memory than the control condition, who did 
not receive the false memory (Figure 1). Ultimately, this suggests that the false memory was 
successfully implanted.  
 Chi-square tests were also performed on the Memory and Belief tasks to determine 
whether the false memory was successfully implanted. Specifically, I tested whether participants 




in the experimental condition were more likely than controls to report that they had “a memory” 
of a negative experience in a math class, or that they had “a belief” that this negative experience 
may have occurred. A significant effect was found for memory, X2 (1, N = 122) = 8.94, p = 
.003; those in the experimental condition were more likely than controls to have a memory of 
having a negative experience in a math class than those in the control condition. Likewise, a 
significant effect was found for belief, X2 (1, N = 117) = 9.92, p = .002. Those in the 
experimental condition were more likely than controls to have a belief that the event (the 
negative experience in a math class) actually occurred (Figures 3 and 4). As expected, there was 
no significant difference between the experimental group and controls on the third item, X2 (1, N 
= 117) = .64, p = .43; the groups were equally likely to say that they believed the event never 
occurred. 
Question 2: Will those exposed to the false memory change their STEM preferences? 
As anticipated, there was no difference between the experimental or control conditions 
for non-STEM related preferences over time, F(1, 120) = 1.11, p = .295. Contrary to my 
hypothesis, there was also no difference between the experimental and control conditions for 
STEM-related preferences over time, F(1, 120) = .23, p = .63; however, there was a significant 
main effect of time, such that both groups demonstrated a decreased preference for STEM-
related items over time F(1, 120) = 17.11, p < .001 (Figure 2).     
Question 3: Is this effect moderated by participants’ original career plans? 




To determine the contributing factors of science motivation, research involvement, and 
science career intent, I ran a series of linear regressions. Overall, there was no significance in any 
of the moderator variables that were examined.  
Controlling for all other factors, science motivation was not predictive of either the 
participant’s view that they had a negative experience in a math class or their change in STEM 
preferences, β = .404, t(114) = 1.20, p = .392; β = -.589, t(118) = 1.20, p = .557. Furthermore, the 
participant’s aspirations for research involvement were also not predictive of their reporting of a 
negative experience in a math class or their change in STEM preferences, β = -.170, t(114) = -
.490, p = .625; β = .034, t(118) = .117, p = .907. Finally, the participant’s science career intent 
was also not predictive of their reporting of a negative experience in a math class or their STEM 
preferences, β = .429, t(114) = 1.08, p = .284;  β = .-376, t(118) = -.849, p = .397.  
In other words, none of these variables significantly influenced the participant’s view that 
they had a negative experience in a math class, which also didn’t influence their STEM 
preferences.  
Discussion 
This study suggests that it is possible to implant a false memory about having a negative 
experience in a math class in female undergraduate students. In other words, false memories 
regarding negative experiences in STEM can indeed be implanted, which can influence 
someone’s memory and beliefs pertaining to a particular field. However, interestingly enough, 
this did not translate to an altered preference for that same field.  
Research Question 1 
With regard to the first research question of if false memories can be successfully 
implanted regarding a negative experience in a math class, it was found that false memories can 




successfully be implanted. This was evident in the results of the study, whereby those in the 
experimental condition were more likely to report a memory of a negative experience in a math 
class over the course of the study. Furthermore, participants in the experimental condition 
reported a stronger memory and belief for this negative experience than those in the control, 
meaning that they were more likely to genuinely believe that the false memory was actually true.  
In the elaboration portion of the study, which was used in attempt to enhance the 
acquisition of the false memory, many participants in the experimental condition described 
various personal experiences that at first may not have seemed so bad, but in retrospect, could be 
considered negative. Some involved explicit mentions of bias from teachers or fellow students, 
while others were more covert in nature. One participant discussed a time when she had a teacher 
who was certainly qualified to be teaching math, but who wasn’t very easy to follow. This 
participant said “my teacher was very, very smart but didn’t know how to communicate what he 
knew. The class moved very quickly, so it was too easy to fall behind.”  
While many of these responses were focused on more direct situations like the ones 
previously mentioned, some participants claimed that they did not necessarily remember having 
a negative experience per say but would then go into extensive detail about an imagined or 
hypothetical event. For instance, one participant said,  
I don’t necessarily remember what the experience was, but I can imagine the situation. I 
used to love math growing up but I remember going into [pre-calc] as a high schooler and 
feeling very unsupported in that class. My teacher just wasn’t helpful and didn’t attempt 
to change up his teaching style for anyone.  
This demonstrates that even though this participant reported not having a negative experience in 
a math class initially, the act of elaborating on this event, though fabricated, can later influence 




their memory and belief pertaining to the field. This finding is consistent with previous literature, 
which suggests that the act of elaborating on an experience, even if completely false in nature, 
can subtly convince someone that the experience they are describing is true simply by making it 
feel more vivid and personal (Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Drivdahl, Zaragoza, & Learned, 2009; 
Zaragoza, Mitchell, Payment, & Drivdahl, 2011).    
Research Question 2 
With regards to our second research question, my analyses next focused on if the 
exposure to the false memory would then translate to a change in preferences for a STEM field. 
Even with the false memory being effectively implanted, surprisingly, the results suggest that 
this did not influence participant’s preferences regarding STEM (Figure 2). Interestingly, both 
groups displayed a similar decreased preference for STEM over time, but there was no 
significant difference between the experimental or control groups. This finding is inconsistent 
with much previous research, which suggests that false memories about negative items should 
decrease your preferences regarding related items (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Bernstein et al., 
2011; Geraerts et al., 2008). However, there is some evidence to suggest that false memories can 
be successfully implanted without influencing later preferences in certain scenarios. For instance, 
in one study, it was determined that only false memories about plausible events, or events that 
participants could realistically imagine having happened to them, lead to a change in their 
attitude. Meanwhile, implausible events, though determined to be successfully implanted, did not 
influence the participant’s attitudes (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Gabbay, 2006).  
When considering the context of this study, this could mean that although the false 
memory of having a negative experience in a math class was successfully implanted, if the 
participant viewed this false memory as implausible in some way, it may not have influenced 




their attitudes regarding STEM. Alternatively, this study may build on previous literature and 
complicate the preconceived notion that false memories automatically translate to altered 
attitudes or behaviors about that particular memory.  
Another possible explanation for why the false memory was successfully implanted but 
didn’t translate to altered preferences for STEM could be that the way preferences were 
evaluated may not have been an entirely valid measure. For instance, by just assessing if the 
participant would be willing to take certain classes may not translate that well to long term 
preferences regarding STEM in a real-world setting. If this were the case, the validity of the 
results may be flawed, which could have drastically impacted the results of the present study. If 
the measure could be revised in future studies, for instance by assessing if the participant’s actual 
later course registrations are impacted by the false memory acquisition, this may potentially 
result in a changed preference for STEM in another way. 
Research Question 3 
 Additionally, with regards to the third research question, it was found that none of the 
variables examined, such as major, science motivation, science career intent, or research 
involvement, were found to be moderators to the results reported above. In other words, the 
results were equally as impactful to all participants in the study, regardless of their particular 
career path or standing within the field of STEM. Furthermore, this implies that all participants 
in the study were equally as susceptible to the implantation of the false memory that was being 
suggested, but in a way that didn’t impact their later preferences.   
These results seem to counter the commonly held notion that certain people are more 
likely to be deterred from a field or career path. For instance, a previous study by Crocker, 
Karpinski, Quinn, and Chase (2003) showed that people who place a high degree of their self-




worth to a particular field take failures in that field much harsher than those who don’t. When 
these people get bad grades, especially for women who strongly identify with a gender-
incongruent field (e.g., engineering), this can lead to a huge drop in self-esteem. Interestingly, 
however, this study also highlighted that while this can lead to a drop of self-esteem, this does 
not lead to less identification with that field (Crocker, Karpinski, Quinn, & Chase, 2003). 
Though the authors of this study did not explicitly mention this, there is evidence to 
suggest that these women could have experiened the phenomenon of stereotype lift. Opposite of 
stereotype threat, stereotype lift is the idea that when peeople are exposed to stereotypes about 
themselves, their behavior may actually work in a way that diametrically opposes that stereotype 
rather than conforms to it (Crisp, Bache, & Maitner, 2009; Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & 
Schimel, 2006; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ho, 2012). For instance, if a woman was reminded of the 
stereotype that “men are better at math,” in a stereotype lift scenario, the women might actually 
perform better in a math test after exposed to the stereotype. This could be one of the reasons 
why the women in this study exhibited signs of a false memory but without a significant change 
in their STEM-related preferences. In other words, even though they were falsely convinced that 
they had a negative experience in a math class, stereotype lift could have been inacted in these 
participants such that rather than significantly diminishing their future STEM-related 
preferences, they didn’t actually disidentify with the field.  
Limitations 
As with any empirical project, this study was limited in a couple of ways. Although there 
is ample research on how presentation modality influences memories and false memories 
(Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Smith, Hunt, & Gallagher, 2008), there has been little research about how 
the use of computers, more specifically, influences the production of false memories. Being that 




I used a computer as the means of both evaluating the participant’s previous experiences and 
attitudes regarding STEM, and later attempt to implant a false memory about this field, my study 
was reliant on my methodology being sound. Since there is limited research on how effective 
false memories can be implanted when not done in a more personal, face-to-face setting, this 
could have potentially limited the results of this study.  
Furthermore, another possible limitation of my study was the sample I used. Being that 
the participants in my study were all college-aged females, this limits the external validity of my 
results slightly. While this study aimed to show that having a false memory about a negative 
experience in a math class can impact a women’s involvement in STEM fields, it is difficult to 
extrapolate the results of this study to a non-college aged demographic. For instance, to say that 
these results could apply to women already in the workforce, more specifically a STEM-related 
career, would be inconclusive.  
Conclusion and Future Directions 
Overall, even with the limitations considered, this study builds off the previous literature 
and has many important implications. Effectively, this study suggests that false memories 
regarding negative experiences in STEM can be implanted, which can influence one’s memory 
and belief about a particular field. However, this does not translate to an altered preference for 
that field. As a whole, false memories may be a contributing factor to the leaky pipeline (Huyer, 
2002) issue of women in STEM. Even though no change in STEM preferences was found, 
women were more convinced after exposure to the false memory that they had a negative 
experience in a math class, which could potentially alter their engagement in STEM in other 
ways that were not examined in the present study. This could have major consequences for the 
educational system and the workforce. Future studies should evaluate if this false memory study 




can be replicated, and if a change in preferences for STEM could be demonstrated using a 
revised or new paradigm.  






Figure 1: The change in participant’s reporting of having a negative experience in a math class 
over time. Green bars represent the experimental condition, which received the false memory, 
while blue bars represent controls. Lines represent Standard Error.  




Figure 2: The change in STEM preferences over time between the experimental (orange) and 









Figure 3: Chi-square analyses representing the participant’s reporting if they have a memory of 
having a negative experience in a math class. Blue bars represent the experimental group, while 
orange bars represent the control.  
 





Figure 4: Chi-square analyses representing the participant’s reporting if they have a belief of 
having a negative experience in a math class. Yellow bars represent the experimental group, 
while purple bars represent the control.  
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Appendix A: Science Motivation Questionnaire 
1. I expect to do well or better than other students in a science course 
 Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
   
 
2. I am confident I will do well on science labs and projects.  
 
Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
   
 
3. I believe I can master the knowledge and skills in a science course.  
 
Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
   
 
4. I believe I can master the knowledge and skills in a science course.  
 
Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
  
  
5. I believe I can master the knowledge and skills in a science course.  
 
Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
  
  
6. I am confident I will do well on science tests. 
 
Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
   
 
7. I believe I can earn a grade of “A” in a science course. 
 
Never       Rarely Sometimes  Usually Always                  
  




Appendix B: Intended Research Involvement Questionnaire 
How likely would you be to do the following:  
Pursue undergraduate research opportunities?  
Not likely at all    Unlikely      Maybe           Likely        Very likely                  
   
 
Volunteer to work in a faculty research lab? 
Not likely at all    Unlikely      Maybe           Likely        Very likely                  
   
 
Volunteer to work on a faculty member’s research team? 
Not likely at all    Unlikely      Maybe           Likely        Very likely                  
   
 
What is your intended major? (Please write answer below. If not sure, write “Undeclared.”) 
________________________________________________________________________ 




Appendix C: Science Career Intent Questionnaire 
I plan to pursue a career in science. 
   Yes                 No 
 
 




Appendix D: Life Events Inventory 
Please rate how certain you are that each event listed below has or has not happened to you 
before the age of 18:  
 
1. Did well in a history class 
 
        1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  




2. Took at least one art class 
 
             1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
3. Avoided taking physical education classes 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
4. Wrote essays  
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
5. Took more than one foreign language class 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
6. Was involved in a music class (e.g. orchestra, band, choir, etc.) 
 
         1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
7. Took at least one math class 





           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
8. Had a negative experience in a math class 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
9. Felt proud of your academic accomplishments 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
10. Were required to take a health class 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
11. Wanted to do well in school 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
12. Had a positive experience playing a sport 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
13. Felt accepted by other students 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
14. Had a negative experience in a science class 





          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
15. Wanted to take more English classes 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
16. Felt forced to take art classes 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
17. Was inspired by a teacher 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
18. Wanted to take fewer music classes 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
19. Felt forced to take foreign language classes 
 
           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 
 
20. Enjoyed school overall 
 
          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8  
Definitely did not happen Definitely 
did happen 




Appendix E: Preferences Inventory 
Please rate the following types of classes based on how much you liked them:  
 
1. Art  
                1    2   3        4         5   6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
2. Biology  
                1    2   3        4         5   6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
3. English  
                1    2   3        4         5   6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
4. History  
                1    2   3        4         5   6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
5. Chemistry 
                1    2   3        4         5   6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
6. Algebra 
                1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
 
Please rate the following classes on how much you would like to take them based only on their 
course titles:  
 
1. “Art, Pop, and Culture” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
2. “The Science of Fear” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
3. “Conservation Biology” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  




Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
4. “Exploring Identity Through Literature” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
5. “Nuclear Technology and Climate” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
6. “Creative Writing” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
7. “Contemporary Mathematics” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
8. “Introduction to Printmaking” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
 
Please rate the following places on how much you would like to visit them: 
 
1. An art gallery  
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
2. A science laboratory  
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
3. A library  
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
4. A music concert 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 





5. A math competition 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
6. A library 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
 
Please rate the following movies based on how much you would like to watch them based only 
on their titles:  
 
1. “The Electricity War” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
2. “The Use of English” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
3. “The Story of Musicals” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
4. “Bad Science” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
5. “Beautiful Equations” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
6. “A Mathematical Mystery Tour” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
7. “How Art Made the World” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 




8. “How Math Explains Humanity’s Greatest Inventions” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  




Please rate the following books based on how much you would like to read them based only on 
their titles:  
 
1. “The Four Pillars of Geometry” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
2. “The Story of Art” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
3. “Music and Language” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
4. “Once Upon an Algorithm: How Stories Explain Computing” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
5. “History of Beauty” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
6. “Language Myths” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like 
 
7. “The Calculus Story: A Mathematical Adventure” 
               1    2    3       4         5    6        7   8  
Definitely don’t like Definitely like




Appendix F: Individualized History Profile 
 
Part A: Experimental Condition 
 
Based on your responses to the previous survey, an individualized profile was created regarding 
your answers. Your answers were collected and analyzed using a sophisticated computer 
program. Your main results are as follows:  
 
1. Were inspired by a teacher 
2. Had a bad experience in a math class 
3. Wrote essays 





Part B: Control Condition 
Based on your responses to the previous survey, an individualized profile was created regarding 
your answers. Your answers were collected and analyzed using a sophisticated computer 
program. Your main results are as follows:  
  
 
1. Were inspired by a teacher 
2. Felt proud of your academic accomplishments 
3. Wrote essays 








Appendix G: Elaboration Exercise 
 
Part A: Experimental Condition 
 
Please elaborate on your experience of having a negative experience in a math class. Where were 
you? What were you doing? Who were you with? How did it make you feel? (If you do not 












Part B: Control Condition  
 
Please elaborate on your experience of feeling proud of your academic accomplishments. Where 
were you? What were you doing? Who were you with? How did it make you feel? (If you do not 













Appendix H: Additional Question 
















Appendix I: Memory or Belief Task 
 
Please indicate whether you:  
 
1. Were required to take a health class 
 
A memory of the specific listed event above   __ Yes     __ No 
Believed it may have occurred    __ Yes    __ No  
Were positive the event never occurred    __ Yes     __ No 
 
2.  Had a negative experience in a math class  
 
A memory of the specific listed event above   __ Yes      __ No 
Believed it may have occurred    __ Yes    __ No 
 Were positive the event never occurred    __ Yes     __ No 
 
3. Were inspired by a teacher 
 
A memory of a specific listed event above   __ Yes    __ No 
Believed it may have occurred   __ Yes    __ No 
Were positive the event never occurred   __ Yes     __ No 
 
What do you believe the purpose of this study was? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 




Appendix J: Dean’s Office Email 
 
 
Dear Regis Student,  
 
You are receiving this email as an invitation to participate in Alexa Jayne’s Psychology Senior 
Thesis Project. If you are a female over the age of 18, you are eligible to participate. This study 
will be assessing your preferences for different types of classes.  
 
If you agree to participate, there will be two surveys that you will take. The link to the first 
survey is attached below. The second survey will be sent to your email a week after you 
complete the first survey. You will receive $5.00 for your participation in the first survey, and 
another $5.00 for completing the second survey.  
 
Thank you for your time and consideration! 
 








Appendix K: Payment Information 
 
Please enter in your email to confirm your participation in this study and in order to 
receive payment. NOTE: if you completed this experiment to fulfill your research credit for a 
course, you will not receive payment for your participation. If you were a volunteer, please visit 
Alexa Jayne in the Psychology and Neuroscience Suite (SCI 105-112) at any of the following 
times to receive your payment: 
 
Tuesdays - 11:00am - 2:00pm 
Wednesdays - 12:30pm - 2:00pm 
Thursdays - 2:00pm - 4:00pm 
Fridays - 12:00 - 1:00pm  
 
If none of these times work, please contact Alexa at ajayne@regis.edu for more information. 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Email: _____________________________ 




Appendix L: Participant ID 
 
To ensure that your answers remain anonymous, please enter a code name using the following 
instructions. Use your first and last name initials followed by the date of your birth. (Example: if 
my name was John Smith and my birthday was on the 22nd, my code would be JS22). This same 
code name will be used in the second survey.  
 
Code: _______________________ 
 
 
